Atomic Reporters is in business to help journalists bring a little more authority to covering nuclear issues by providing training and encouraging discussion. Among the schools of science, nuclear is a Cinderella yet it is pivotal to global security and safety.
To achieve its goals Atomic Reporters links journalists with experts as it seeks to broaden understanding, a two way street indeed. It also offers comment on the hazards journalists may face in providing evidence based reporting for their readers and viewers because of the wide range of views being expressed.
Last week we posted an “Ombudsman Column” called “Curveballs, Sliders and the Little Pitches that Start Big Wars.” Because it drew on a wide community of experts and journalists it was bylined ‘ Atomic Reporters.’
This tongue-in-cheek effort seeking to illuminate some of the very real disagreements about matters of fact swirling around the Iran nuclear file was deemed too harsh and caused offence and upset to people named in the report, for which we express regret.
We are a newly minted organization unique in our commitment to supporting journalists covering this challenging file. We try to get it right but don’t always succeed. When style detracts from the serious content we are trying to address clearly we’ve not succeeded and we will strive to do better.
Thanks for your support: Peter Rickwood, Atomic Reporters founder & director
State level concepts, or SLC, have been a burr under the IAEA’s saddle as it seeks to introduce a broader approach to its conduct of safeguards
to verify states’ compliance with their obligations under the Treaty On The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).
The SLC is a comprehensive approach to implementing safeguards that emphasizes using all available and relevant information about a state’s nuclear program to guide the Agency’s safeguards activities in that state, instead of focusing on specific facilities.
A safeguards implementation plan for a specific state that uses this concept is called a state-level approach.
According to the IAEA, applying state-level approaches allows it to more efficiently use its limited resources and focus more on detection of possible undeclared activities.
The Agency says that the SLC approach is more efficient and makes better use of its resources by using all available and relevant information about a state’s nuclear program instead of focusing on specific facilities.
There has been resistance from several IAEA member states to SLC. At the start of its Safeguards Symposium, 20 – 24 October, regrettably closed to media, the following statement was delivered by the head of Russia’s delegation Grigory Berdennikov.
Our cohorts at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation have put out a set of fact sheets on this year’s IAEA General Conference for all to see. They detail the overall topics that will be covered at the conference, as well as Middle East issues and safeguards.
You can brush up on your nuclear here: http://www.nonproliferation.org/2014-iaea-general-conference/
“The most essential gift for a good writer is a built-in, shockproof, shit detector.”
– Ernest Hemingway, May 1954
The summer hiatus is over and Atomic Reporters are back to work. The Iran nuclear negotiations are in overtime. The International Atomic Energy Agency’s 58th General Conference is set to begin Sept. 22. A list of key documents, including the Director General’s report on Middle East safeguards, can be found here.
Elsewhere, open-source proponent Robert Steele, who runs the Phi Beta Iota Public Intelligence Blog, has an interesting post that resonates with Atomic Reporters. University of Las Vegas computer scientist Hal Berghel cites Neil Postman’s 1969 speech “Bullshit and the Art of Crap-Detection” in a new essay:
DEFENDING AGAINST BIG DADA: DEFENSIVE TACTICS FOR WEAPONS OF MASS DECEPTION
“…Though worthy, the study of informal logic from one serious shortcoming: it assumes that truthful statements are the sine qua non of meaningful communication. Informal fallacies document the point at which serious reasoning foes awry. Even when embedded in a broader, over-arching “argumentation theory” or dialectic, informal logic assumes that traditional fallacies are departures from the conversational norm – but not the norm itself.
“Violations of the rules of sound argument are red flags in any discussion worthy of serious attention. But propaganda, polemic, subterfuge, and trickery eschew sound argument. They seek to manipulate, maneuver, control the listener and obstruct paths from reflection to sound judgment. Rhetorical weaponry – like lying and deceit – assaults the sensibilities with false flags and distractions that informal logic just can’t handle. When it comes to criminals, politicians, and ideologues, we need to pull out the nuclear option…”
• ” There is a serious danger inherent in the India Additional Protocol”
• ” The IAEA would be far better off to offer India a voluntary-offer agreement like it has with the official Nuclear Weapons States”
Robert Kelley, the former IAEA safeguards inspector with three decades of experience in the U.S. national laboratories, has been in the news lately. Writing for IHS Jane’s, Kelley and co-author Brian Cloughley showed that India appeared to be expanding its uranium enrichment program and that fissile material produced at the country’s Mysore facility may support its thermonuclear weapons program. Following publication of the Jane’s report, India moved to ratify its Additional Protocol with the IAEA after years of delay. A copy of India’s AP was published by the Arms Control Law website. The following is Kelley’s analysis of India’s AP agreement with the agency:
Continue reading Unconditional Surrender – India’s Exceptional Protocol
The IAEA has released a new, brief report titled “Status of Iran’s Nuclear Programme in relation to the Joint Plan of Action” which examines Iran’s commitments made in November of 2013. We’ve uploaded the entire report which can be read here: gov-inf-2014-14
Q: Why did the Iranians cross the EBW road?
A: To supply an $800 million market prone to disruption?
The din over Iran’s detonator program is rumbling back to life. Atomic Reporters wrote already about the dual-use nature of exploding bridge wire. The U.S. recently imposed trade restrictions on similar detonators destined to facilitate Russian oil and gas extraction.