Category Archives: Iran

“Not Authentic”

The Associated Press on 19/08/15 published a report based upon what it claimed was the near-final draft of an agreement between Iran and the IAEA covering inspections at the Parchin military site. The response to the story ranged from claims it meant the death of the P5+1 Iran deal to other responses that it was hardly a sticking point at all. Tariq Rauf,  former Head, Verification and Security Policy Coordination, IAEA; Director of the Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and a board member of Atomic Reporters has reviewed and annotated the document and suggests it is not authentic.

Click below to see Tariq’s notes and thoughts on the entire transcript.


AP_with annotations 12 and 13 21Aug pr

Environmental Sampling in Iran

by Tariq Rauf

On 14 July 2015, after more than two years of intensive negotiations, the E3/EU+3* and Iran agreed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear activities. On the same day, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran agreed on a work plan called the ‘Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program’. Under the road map, the IAEA and Iran also concluded separate arrangements to address Parchin and other outstanding issues.

(Source: IAEA)
(Source: IAEA)

The 20.08.15 story, AP Exclusive: UN to let Iran inspect alleged nukework site, by George Jahn, on IAEA monitoring and verification in Iran at Parchin[1] concerns two separate but related issues (1) IAEA environmental sampling and (2) IAEA (managed) access, to sites and locations at the Parchin military-industrial facility.

With regard to environmental sampling, this is not rocket science at the front end, i.e., taking swipes off walls, doors, floors, cracks, equipment, machinery, drains, etc. using small squares of fabric. These swipes are placed in clear plastic bags, much like
the ones at airport security. Each swipe sampling kit has six sterile swipes in a sterile plastic bag. All six swipes are put back in the plastic bag after use, and three or four or more bags worth of swipes are collected at each location. The bags are sealed there and then on-site by IAEA safeguards inspectors[1] and transported to the IAEA Nuclear Material Laboratory (NML)[2] at Seibersdorf (near Vienna).[3] At the NML, the bags are opened in a sterile environment and the swipes are re-bagged and given numeric labels for anonymization. One set of swipes is analyzed by the IAEA at NML and the IAEA Environmental Sample Laboratory (ESL) at Seibersdorf to detect the presence of uranium or plutonium, and two or three sets are sent out to two or three different laboratories randomly selected from the 18 labs of the IAEA Network of Analytical Labs (NWAL) in nine States, with the one of the most advanced being AFTAC (Air Force Technical Applications Centre[4]) in the US.

(Source: IAEA Graphic from the author’s presentation on safeguards.)

The “rocket-science” comes into play at the labs where through very sophisticated analyses using electron microscopes and mass spectrometers nuclear material can be detected at the nano-gram level.[5] There is no way an inspected State confidently can “sanitize” or erase all signs of nuclear material where it has been used at a location.

Under regular IAEA safeguards inspections, Agency inspectors carry out the swiping and collection of samples, as at Bushehr, Esfahan, Natanz, Fordow and elsewhere in Iran. Parchin being a military industrial facility is not subject to regular IAEA safeguards as it is not a “nuclear facility” as defined for purposes of IAEA safeguards. The IAEA, however, can request and obtain access to a facility such as Parchin under “managed access” provisions of Iran’s Additional Protocol (AP) to its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. It would be unusual but by no means technically compromising to have Iranian technicians collect swipe samples at sites and locations at Parchin in the physical presence and direct line of sight of IAEA inspectors, including filming, and using swipe kits and collection bags provided by the IAEA. The Agency inspectors then would seal the bags containing the swipe samples; they could leave behind one sealed bag at the IAEA Office in Iran as a “control” to be used if there is a dispute later about the results. The other three or four bags of swipe samples would be taken by the IAEA to NML/ESL and the analytical procedures described above would come into play. The results from all three or four labs to have analyzed the samples must match to give a positive or a negative finding on the presence and isotopics of uranium and/or plutonium. Given the sensitivity of the Iran nuclear file, it is not unreasonable under the circumstances for Iran to insist on following the sampling taking by its technicians in the presence of Agency inspectors noted above, mainly to guard against the risk of inadvertent contamination from nuclear material traces on the clothing of the inspectors which might have been worn at some other location in another country at a previous inspection. Such contamination while rare is not unknown and has occurred in a few cases elsewhere.

To conclude, the environmental sampling taking carried out at Parchin by Iranian technicians under the direct supervision and control of IAEA inspectors would not necessarily compromise the environmental sampling exercise.  (See the IAEA video on environmental sample analysis at NML/ESL.[6])

Tariq Rauf is a Director on the Board of Atomic Reporters. Currently, he is the Director of the Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), former Head of Verification and Security Policy Coordination, Office reporting to the Director General, International Atomic Energy Agency.

(Photo: IAEA)
(Photo: IAEA)
(Photo: IAEA)
(Photo: IAEA)

[1] AP Exclusive: UN to let Iran inspect alleged nuke work site, by George Jahn, 19 Aug. 2015:

[1] See IAEA video on “A Nuclear Inspection”:

[2] See, IAEA, The IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratories: The Science Essential to Verifying the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Material,

[3] For an IAEA video on “How IAEA inspectors Swipe to Detect Nuclear Materials”,


[5] For a detailed description, see the SIPRI publication: Vitaly Fedchenko (ed.), The New Nuclear Forensics: Analysis of Nuclear Materials for Security Purposes, Oxford University Press, 2015, © SIPRI, especially chapters 3, 5 and 9.

[6] IAEA, “Nuclear Sleuths”:




Nuclear Verification in Iran: Managed Access

By Tariq Rauf

 VIENNA, 8 July 2015: On Tuesday, the dance of the dueling cavaliers continued below the chandeliers and above the cellars that boast 60,000 bottles – one of the largest stocks of Mouton Rothschild, Château Yquem and Pétrus in the world – of the neo-classical Palais Saxe-Coburg (Palais Coburg) in Vienna (Austria, Europe). The principal players, Iran and the United States slogged ahead on finalizing a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on limiting the proliferation potential of Iran’s nuclear programme and the rescinding of Western and United Nations sanctions. China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, Germany and the European Union played both disruptive and supporting roles.

The 7 July deadline was extended to 9 July and the talks continued with US Secretary of State John Kerry and Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and their teams tried to overcome their remaining differences. These concerned Iran’s determination to reverse UN Security Council sanctions on its non-nuclear military and defence programmes. Apparently, the Western States remain adamantly opposed but China and Russia supported Iran’s position while France wavered. Many of the foreign ministers left Vienna in the late afternoon and are scheduled to return on Friday, 10 July, to wrap up the JCPOA – which will be worked on in the interim by the ‘plumbers’ otherwise referred to as lawyers, nuclear and arms control experts.

Nuclear Verification: Managed Access

In accordance with the key parameters of a JCPOA decided in Lausanne between Iran and the EU/E3+3 on 2 April 2015, Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement and to cooperate with the IAEA to resolve questions regarding possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. Furthermore, pursuant to the 24 November 2013 joint Plan of Action (JPA) has been providing ‘managed access’ to the IAEA to some of its nuclear facilities. These include the uranium mine and mill at Gchine, the Saghand Uranium Mine, the Ardakan Uranium Production Plant, centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities.

The Additional Protocol to Iran’s comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA includes provisions for Iran to provide ‘managed access’ upon request by the Agency to prevent the dissemination of proliferation sensitive information, to meet safety or physical protection requirements, or to protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information. In the drafting of the Additional Protocol, the IAEA Board of Governors took into account the arrangements for the investigation of sites of possible undeclared facilities drawing on the elements (including the ‘managed access’ provisions) contained in Part X of the Verification Annex to the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

In practice, in order for the IAEA to come up with an “assessment” report on the PMD as indicated by the IAEA Director General, Iran will be required to provide ‘managed access’ to certain military sites such as Parchin to enable the Agency to determine whether or not prohibited nuclear military activities were carried out.

In order to ensure the rights and obligations of both the IAEA and Iran, any ‘managed access’ carried out at military and other sites deemed to be of national security significance by Iran, should be in accordance with mutually agreed procedures and practices.

At present there are no procedures and practices pertaining to ‘managed access’ by the IAEA that have been duly approved by the Agency’s Board of Governors and Member States. As such, the following methodologies could be considered for ‘managed access’ in Iran.

Pre-access briefing and inspection plan 

The purpose and mandate of the ‘managed access’ should be agreed in advance between the Agency and Iran. 

To facilitate development of a plan for ‘managed access’ at a site or location, Iran should provide a safety and logistical briefing to the IAEA inspection team prior to the ‘managed access’. The pre-inspection briefing may indicate to the IAEA inspection team the equipment, documentation, or areas Iran considers sensitive and not related to the purpose of the ‘managed access’ along with a justification. In addition, personnel responsible for the site or location should brief the IAEA inspection team on the physical layout and other relevant characteristics of the site or location. The IAEA inspection team should be provided with a map or sketch drawn to scale showing all structures and significant geographic features at the site relevant to the purpose of the ‘managed access’. 

After the pre-inspection briefing, the IAEA inspection team could prepare, on the basis of the information available to it, an initial inspection plan which specifies the activities to be carried out by the inspection team, including the specific areas of the site to which ‘managed access’ is requested. The inspection plan also should specify whether the inspection team will be divided into sub-groups. The inspection plan shall be made available to the representatives of the inspection site. 

Iran can designate the perimeter entry/exit points to be used for access. The IAEA inspection team and Iran’s escort team could negotiate: the extent of access to any particular place or places within the final and requested perimeters; the particular ‘managed access’ activities, including non-destructive sampling, to be conducted by the IAEA inspection team; the performance of particular supporting activities by Iran; and the provision of particular information by Iran.


To help establish that the inspection site to which the inspection team has been transported corresponds to the inspection site specified by the IAEA, the inspection team should have the right to use commercially available location finding equipment and to have such equipment inspected by Iran to ensure that its characteristics and capabilities are as declared by the IAEA. The IAEA inspection team may verify its location by reference to local landmarks identified from maps and satellite imagery, and Iran should assist the inspection team in this task.

In addition, the IAEA may use equipment from its suite of safeguards technology and equipment.


Only inspectors duly ‘designated’ by Iran could be allowed to go on ‘managed access’. The size of the IAEA inspection team should be kept to a minimum necessary for the proper fulfilment of the inspection mandate.  

Protective Measures

Iran could take measures to protect sensitive installations and prevent disclosure of confidential information and data not related to the nuclear fuel cycle. Such measures may include, inter alia: (a) removal of sensitive documents from office spaces; (b) shrouding of sensitive displays, stores, and equipment; (c) shrouding of sensitive pieces of equipment, such as military, communications, engineering, computer or electronic systems; (d) logging off of computer systems and turning off of data indicating devices; (e) restriction of sample analysis to presence or absence of nuclear material; (f) using random selective access techniques whereby the inspectors are requested to select a given percentage or number of buildings of their choice to inspect; the same principle can apply to the interior and content of sensitive buildings; (g) In exceptional cases, giving only individual inspectors access to certain parts of the inspection site.


The IAEA inspection team would be free to collect environmental samples according to Agency procedures and practices, but Iran would be free to photograph or videotape the taking of environmental samples and provide a copy of the media to the Agency. A duly sealed duplicate bag of environmental samples could be left under IAEA containment and surveillance (C/S) measures at its field office in Iran to be used in the event of any dispute over the findings of the sample analysis.


Iran would be expected to make every reasonable effort to demonstrate to the IAEA inspection team that any object, building, structure, container or vehicle to which the inspection team has not had full access, or which has been protected or shrouded, is not used for purposes related to the possible non-compliance concerns raised in the inspection request. This may be accomplished by means of, inter alia, the partial removal of a shroud or environmental protection cover, at the discretion of Iran, by means of a visual inspection of the interior of an enclosed space from its entrance, or by other methods.

Post-access Activities

Upon completion of the ‘managed access’ procedures at the inspection site, the IAEA inspection team should be taken promptly to a point of site entry/exit.

An inspection report could summarize in a general way the activities conducted by the IAEA inspection team and the factual findings of the inspection team. It could also include an assessment by the inspection team of the degree and nature of access and cooperation granted to the inspectors and the extent to which this enabled them to fulfil the inspection mandate.

Iran should have the right to identify any information and data not related to nuclear fuel cycle activities which should, in its view, due to its confidential character, not be circulated beyond specific experts of the IAEA Iran Task Force and should not be included in the reports of the Director General nor provided in confidential briefings to any IAEA Member State.


In accordance with Iran’s safeguards obligations, Iran is obliged to provide ‘managed access’ to the IAEA at sites and locations requested by the Agency. However, under ‘managed access’ there is scope for negotiations between the Agency and Iran on a case-by-case basis. ‘Managed access’ may be defined as the arrangements made by the inspected State to protect sensitive installations and confidential information not related to the purpose of the access, while still granting limited access to inspectors to conduct verification activities or providing alternative means to demonstrate compliance. As such, Iran would be within its rights to take the following measures: (a) shrouding of sensitive displays, stores, and equipment; (b) restricting the taking of samples to determining the presence or absence of nuclear material relevant to the purpose of the access; (c) managing access to buildings and other structures; and (d) declaring restricted-access sites.

The IAEA would have the right to request ‘managed access’ to any site or location specified by it to carry out location-specific environmental sampling, to conduct safeguards activities necessary to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, including the resolution of a question relating to the correctness and completeness of Iran’s declaration pursuant to Article 2 of its Additional Protocol or of an inconsistency relating to that information.

In the end, it is in the interest of Iran to facilitate regular safeguards implementation including ‘managed access’ by the IAEA to enable the Agency to provide credible assurance regarding the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.

The Iran Nuclear File: No Alternative but a Diplomatic Solution

By Tariq Rauf[i]

VIENNA, 7 July 2015: The diplomatic minuet continues in the historic Palais Coburg in Vienna between Iran and the United States, to the accompaniment of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, Germany and the European Union, on finalizing an agreement on limiting the proliferation potential of Iran’s nuclear programme and the rescinding of Western sanctions.

Originally scheduled to conclude by 7 July, the talks continue with US Secretary of State John Kerry and Iran’s Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif struggling to bridge their remaining differences and to have their legal and technical experts come up with the elements of detailed technical annexes to a comprehensive agreement on the Iran nuclear file.

This comprehensive agreement would lay out the details of the limits to Iran’s uranium enrichment programme, restrictions on the characteristics of its research reactor, an enhanced monitoring and verification regime supplementing nuclear safeguards implemented by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and clarification of possible military dimensions (PMD) to Iran’s nuclear programme. The fact that a great deal of long-standing mistrust continues between Iran and the US is a sticking point in the talks.

The divergences appear to be the timing and extent of the lifting of Western sanctions as Iran implements the technical aspects of a comprehensive agreement on scaling back its nuclear programme, as well as the re-imposition of sanctions by the West and the resumption of full-scale nuclear fuel cycle activities by Iran, should either side fail to live up to its respective commitments and obligations.

Even though the negotiations which started in June 2013 have been extended four times beyond their self-imposed timelines respectively in November 2013, July 2014, March 2015 and June 30, and a fifth deadline of 7 July also is likely to go by, unprecedented progress already has been achieved both in terms of Iran’s nuclear restraint and IAEA verification, as well as a breakthrough in US-Iran diplomacy. These achievements are the product of painstaking diplomacy and could never have been achieved through military action (as advocated by the ‘new crazies’ of the times).

Joint Plan of Action

In accordance with the “voluntary measures” that Iran has agreed to implement under the Joint Plan of Action (JPA)[1] agreed between Iran and the EU/E3+3[2] on 24 November 2013, as confirmed by the IAEA[3] Iran has is fulfilling its obligations under the JPA and inter alia to date has:

  • continued to provide daily access to the enrichment facilities under safeguards at Natanz and Fordow[4];
  • not enriched uranium above 5% U-235 at any of its declared facilities – Natanz and Fordow;
  • diluted – down to an enrichment level of no more than 5% U-235 – 108.4 kg of UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235;
  • not reconverted uranium oxides back into UF6;
  • not made “any further advances” to its activities at the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) or the Arak reactor (IR-40 Reactor), including the manufacture and testing of fuel for the IR-40 Reactor;
  • provided updated Design Information for the IR-40 Reactor and agreed on a safeguards approach and safeguards measures for the reactor;
  • not accumulated enriched uranium while continuing enrichment R&D practices at the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) under safeguards;
  • not carried out (plutonium) reprocessing related activities at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility or at any of the other facilities to which the Agency has access;
  • provided information and managed access to the uranium mine and mill at Gchine, to the Saghand Uranium Mine and the Ardakan Uranium Production Plant;
  • provided regular managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities, and provided information thereon; and
  • provided, in relation to enhanced monitoring: – plans for nuclear facilities and a description of each building on each nuclear site; – descriptions of the scale of operations being conducted for each location engaged in specified nuclear activities; and – information on uranium mines and mills, and on source material.

Thus, it is clear that the technical measures agreed through diplomatic understandings contained in the JPA between Iran and the EU/E3+3 are working and already have reduced the proliferation potential of Iran’s uranium enrichment programme even while negotiations continue on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This success is the result of the diplomatic path wisely chosen by US President Barack Obama and Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani and implemented by their foreign ministers John Kerry and Javad Zarif, despite the irrational clamour of their critics.

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

On 2 April 2015, the ‘key parameters’ of a JCPOA regarding Iran’s nuclear programme were decided in Lausanne between Iran and the EU/E3+3.[5] These elements form the basis upon which the final text of the JCPOA and its technical annexes is presently being negotiated in Vienna. In summary, the JCPOA provides for the following measures to be implemented that remove the proliferation dangers of Iran’s nuclear programme and specify the phasing out of sanctions against Iran.


  • Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its 19,000 installed centrifuges to 6,104 installed IR-1 centrifuges, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years, and to not enrich uranium over 3.67 % U-235 for at least 15 years;
  • Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67% LEU for 15 years;
  • Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow uranium enrichment facility to a nuclear, physics, technology, research centre, and to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years nor have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years;
  • All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will remain under IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment;
  • Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters that have been agreed to by the EU/E3+3;
  • Iran has agreed to not build any new uranium enrichment facilities for 15 years;
  • For 10 years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.

Inspections and Transparency

  • The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies;
  • IAEA inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear programme and the new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret programme;
  • IAEA inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years;
  • A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’s nuclear programme will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology;
  • Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol to its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, thus providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear programme, including both declared and undeclared facilities;
  • Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country;
  • Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 of the subsidiary arrangements to its NPT Safeguards Agreement on requiring early notification to the IAEA of construction of new facilities;
  • Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its nuclear programme.

Reactors and Reprocessing

  • Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the EU/E3+3, that will not produce weapons-grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production;
  • The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country;
  • Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime;
  • Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel, and Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor, and will sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years;
  • Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.


  • Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments;
  • U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place;
  • The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance;
  • All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency);
  • Core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution;
  • A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments;
  • If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed;
  • U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.


  • For 10 years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development – ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the EU/E3+3.
  • For 15 years, Iran will limit additional elements of its nuclear programme. Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures.
  • Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25 years.
  • Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear programme.

The Way Forward

Negotiations continue in Vienna to resolve the remaining differences over the phasing out of sanctions and the parallel measures to be implemented by Iran on scaling back its uranium enrichment programme and accepting an enhanced IAEA monitoring and verification regime under the terms of a JCPOA.

The IAEA seems to have been given its directions by the Western parties “with cooperation from Iran … [to] issue a report by the end of the year on the assessment of the clarification of the issues related to the possible military dimensions”[6]. This timeline likely cannot be met as the IAEA probably will need about six months after agreement on a JCPOA to issue an “assessment” report on PMD – the normal practice for the IAEA is to provide safeguards conclusions not assessments. However, such an assessment could provide a way out for moving on from the PMD issue, particularly as Secretary Kerry has said that “the possible military dimensions, frankly, gets distorted a little bit in some of the discussion, in that we’re not fixated on Iran specifically accounting for what they did at one point in time or another. We know what they did. We have no doubt. We have absolute knowledge with respect to the certain military activities they were engaged in. What we’re concerned about is going forward. It’s critical to us to know that going forward, those activities have been stopped, and that we can account for that in a legitimate way”[7].

It would likely take the IAEA up to two years or more to come up with safeguards conclusions for Iran pursuant to Iran’s implementation of the Additional Protocol given the time-consuming and complex safeguards activities and determinations required. An IAEA “assessment” report on PMD, however, could be done in a few months with Iran’s cooperation, providing the IAEA’s findings that could be accepted by the Agency’s Board of Governors and the EU/E3+3 as forming the basis for moving to routine implementation of safeguards in Iran along with JCPOA monitoring and verification, without requiring a formal admission by Iran on PMD. Thus, paving the way forward for the continuation of the implementation of the JCPOA and the lifting of sanctions leading to a sort of normalization of relations between the West and Iran and signifying a major success for diplomacy.


[i] Tariq Rauf in his personal capacity is a Director of Atomic Reporters. He is the Director of the Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Programme at SIPRI since February 2014. From 2002­ to 2011, he served as Head, Verification and Security Policy Coordination, Office reporting to the Director General at the International Atomic Energy Agency and covered both high-priority and routine safeguards matters among other issues – A version of this essay is available at

[1] For a brief history of the Joint Plan of Action, see SIPRI Yearbook 2015, Chapter 12, Iran’s nuclear programme by Tariq Rauf.

[2] EU/E3+3 = European Union, plus France, Germany and the UK, plus China, Russian Federation and the United States.

[3] IAEA, Report by the Director General, Status of Iran’s Nuclear Programme in relation to the Joint Plan of Action, GOV/INF/2015/12 (1 July 2015).

[4] For a list of nuclear facilities in Iran, see Tariq Rauf and Robert Kelley, Nuclear Verification in Iran, Arms Control Today, September 2014.

[5] US Department of State, Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program, Media Note, Office of the Spokesperson, Washington, DC, 2 April 2015.

[6] IAEA, IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano’s Remarks to Media in Vienna on Iran Talks, Saturday 4 July 2015 10:00 CEST, 2015/27.

[7] Secretary Kerry’s Press Availability, Via Teleconference, 16 June 2015,

Statement for the Record Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Tehran has made technical progress in a number of areas—including uranium enrichment, nuclear reactors, and ballistic missiles—from which it could draw if it decided to build missile-deliverable nuclear weapons. These technical advancements strengthen our assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons. This makes the central issue its political will to do so.

Of particular note, Iran has made progress during the past year by installing additional centrifuges at the Fuel Enrichment Plant, developing advanced centrifuge designs, and stockpiling more low-enriched uranium hexafluoride (LEUF6). These improvements have better positioned Iran to produce weapons grade uranium (WGU) using its declared facilities and uranium stockpiles, if it chooses to do so. Despite this progress, we assess that Iran would not be able to divert safeguarded material and produce enough WGU for a weapon before such activity would be discovered. Iran has also continued to work toward starting up the IR-40 Heavy Water Research Reactor near Arak.

We assess that if Iran fully implements the Joint Plan, it will temporarily halt the expansion of its enrichment program, eliminate its production and stockpile of 20-percent enriched uranium in a form suitable for further enrichment, and provide additional transparency into its existing and planned nuclear facilities. This transparency would provide earlier warning of a breakout using these facilities.

Read the full report:

2014 WWTA SFR_SSCI_29_Jan

Originally posted at:

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